RULE 3.191. SPEEDY TRIAL
(a) Speedy Trial without Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this rule, and subject to the limitations
imposed under subdivisions (e) and (f), every person charged with a crime shall be brought to trial within 90 days of
arrest if the crime charged is a misdemeanor, or within 175 days of arrest if the crime charged is a felony. If trial is
not commenced within these time periods, the defendant shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in
subdivision (p). The time periods established by this subdivision shall commence when the person is taken into
custody as defined under subdivision (d). A person charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of this rule
whether the person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of this state or a political subdivision thereof or is
at liberty on bail or recognizance or other pretrial release condition. This subdivision shall cease to apply whenever a
person files a valid demand for speedy trial under subdivision (b).
(b) Speedy Trial upon Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this rule, and subject to the limitations
imposed under subdivisions (e) and (g), every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall have
the right to demand a trial within 60 days, by filing with the court a separate pleading entitled “Demand for Speedy
Trial,” and serving a copy on the prosecuting authority.
(1) No later than 5 days from the filing of a demand for speedy trial, the court shall hold a calendar call, with
notice to all parties, for the express purposes of announcing in open court receipt of the demand and of setting the
case for trial.
(2) At the calendar call the court shall set the case for trial to commence at a date no less than 5 days nor more
than 45 days from the date of the calendar call.
(3) The failure of the court to hold a calendar call on a demand that has been properly filed and served shall
not interrupt the running of any time periods under this subdivision.
(4) If the defendant has not been brought to trial within 50 days of the filing of the demand, the defendant shall
have the right to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (p).
(c) Commencement of Trial. A person shall be considered to have been brought to trial if the trial commences
within the time herein provided. The trial is considered to have commenced when the trial jury panel for that specific
trial is sworn for voir dire examination or, on waiver of a jury trial, when the trial proceedings begin before the
(d) Custody. For purposes of this rule, a person is taken into custody (1) when the person is arrested as a result of the
conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged, or (2) when the person is served with a notice to appear
in lieu of physical arrest.
(e) Prisoners outside Jurisdiction. A person who is in federal custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional
institution outside the jurisdiction of this state or a subdivision thereof, and who is charged with a crime by indictment
or information issued or filed under the laws of this state, is not entitled to the benefit of this rule until that person
returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within which the Florida charge is pending and until written notice
of the person’s return is filed with the court and served on the prosecutor. For these persons, the time period under
subdivision (a) commences on the date the last act required under this subdivision occurs. For these persons the time
period under subdivision (b) commences when the demand is filed so long as the acts required under this subdivision
occur before the filing of the demand. If the acts required under this subdivision do not precede the filing of the demand,
the demand is invalid and shall be stricken upon motion of the prosecuting attorney. Nothing in this rule shall affect a
prisoner’s right to speedy trial under law.
(f) Consolidation of Felony and Misdemeanor. When a felony and a misdemeanor are consolidated for
disposition in circuit court, the misdemeanor shall be governed by the same time period applicable to the felony.
(g) Demand for Speedy Trial; Accused Is Bound. A demand for speedy trial binds the accused and the state. No
demand for speedy trial shall be filed or served unless the accused has a bona fide desire to obtain a trial sooner than
otherwise might be provided. A demand for speedy trial shall be considered a pleading that the accused is available
for trial, has diligently investigated the case, and is prepared or will be prepared for trial within 5 days. A demand
filed by an accused who has not diligently investigated the case or who is not timely prepared for trial shall be
stricken as invalid on motion of the prosecuting attorney. A demand may not be withdrawn by the accused except on
order of the court, with consent of the state or on good cause shown. Good cause for continuances or delay on behalf
of the accused thereafter shall not include nonreadiness for trial, except as to matters that may arise after the demand
for trial is filed and that reasonably could not have been anticipated by the accused or counsel for the accused. A
person who has demanded speedy trial, who thereafter is not prepared for trial, is not entitled to continuance or delay
except as provided in this rule.
(h) Notice of Expiration of Time for Speedy Trial; When Timely. A notice of expiration of speedy trial time
shall be timely if filed and served on or after the expiration of the periods of time for trial provided in this rule.
However, a notice of expiration of speedy trial time filed before expiration of the period of time for trial is invalid
and shall be stricken on motion of the prosecuting attorney.
(i) When Time May Be Extended. The periods of time established by this rule may be extended, provided the
period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension was procured. An extension may be
(1) stipulation, announced to the court or signed in proper person or by counsel, by the party against whom the
stipulation is sought to be enforced;
(2) written or recorded order of the court on the court’s own motion or motion by either party in exceptional
circumstances as hereafter defined in subdivision (l);
(3) written or recorded order of the court with good cause shown by the accused; or
(4) written or recorded order of the court for a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from
proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical
ability of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings on pretrial motions, for appeals by the state, and for trial of other
pending criminal charges against the accused.
(j) Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion. If trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of
time established by this rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that:
(1) a time extension has been ordered under subdivision (i) and that extension has not expired;
(2) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a codefendant in the same trial, or their counsel;
(3) the accused was unavailable for trial under subdivision (k); or
(4) the demand referred to in subdivision (g) is invalid.
If the court finds that discharge is not appropriate for reasons under subdivisions (j)(2), (3), or (4), the pending
motion for discharge shall be denied, provided, however, that trial shall be scheduled and commence within 90 days
of a written or recorded order of denial.
(k) Availability for Trial. A person is unavailable for trial if the person or the person’s counsel fails to attend a
proceeding at which either’s presence is required by these rules, or the person or counsel is not ready for trial on the
date trial is scheduled. A person who has not been available for trial during the term provided for in this rule is not
entitled to be discharged. No presumption of nonavailability attaches, but if the state objects to discharge and
presents any evidence tending to show nonavailability, the accused must establish, by competent proof, availability
during the term.
(l) Exceptional Circumstances. As permitted by subdivision (i) of this rule, the court may order an extension of the
time periods provided under this rule when exceptional circumstances are shown to exist. Exceptional circumstances
shall not include general congestion of the court’s docket, lack of diligent preparation, failure to obtain available
witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays. Exceptional circumstances are those that, as a matter of substantial
justice to the accused or the state or both, require an order by the court. These circumstances include:
(1) unexpected illness, unexpected incapacity, or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose
presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial;
(2) a showing by the state that the case is so unusual and so complex, because of the number of defendants or
the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation
within the periods of time established by this rule;
(3) a showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available despite diligent efforts to secure it,
but will become available at a later time;
(4) a showing by the accused or the state of necessity for delay grounded on developments that could not have
been anticipated and that materially will affect the trial;
(5) a showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a codefendant, when there is reason not to sever the
cases to proceed promptly with trial of the defendant; and
(6) a showing by the state that the accused has caused major delay or disruption of preparation of proceedings,
as by preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise.
(m) Effect of Mistrial; Appeal; Order of New Trial. A person who is to be tried again or whose trial has been
delayed by an appeal by the state or the defendant shall be brought to trial within 90 days from the date of
declaration of a mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the trial court granting a new trial, the date of an
order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate,
order, or notice of whatever form from a reviewing court that makes possible a new trial for the defendant,
whichever is last in time. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed time periods, the defendant shall
be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (p).
(n) Discharge from Crime; Effect. Discharge from a crime under this rule shall operate to bar prosecution of the
crime charged and of all other crimes on which trial has not commenced nor conviction obtained nor adjudication
withheld and that were or might have been charged as a result of the same conduct or criminal episode as a lesser
degree or lesser included offense.
(o) Nolle Prosequi; Effect. The intent and effect of this rule shall not be avoided by the state by entering a nolle
prosequi to a crime charged and by prosecuting a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode or
otherwise by prosecuting new and different charges based on the same conduct or criminal episode whether or not
the pending charge is suspended, continued, or is the subject of entry of a nolle prosequi.
(p) Remedy for Failure to Try Defendant within the Specified Time.
(1) No remedy shall be granted to any defendant under this rule until the court has made the required inquiry
under subdivision (j).
(2) At any time after the expiration of the prescribed time period, the defendant may file a separate pleading
entitled “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time,” and serve a copy on the prosecuting authority.
(3) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall
hold a hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists, shall
order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-day period
through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged from the
1972 Amendment. Same as prior rule. The schedule is omitted as being unnecessary.
1977 Amendment. An appeal by the state from an order dismissing the case constitutes an interlocutory appeal and should be treated as such.
The additional phrase removes any ambiguities in the existing rule.
(a)(1). Speedy Trial without Demand.
1. Prisoners in Florida institutions are now treated like any other defendant [formerly (b)(1)].
2. Federal prisoners and prisoners outside Florida may claim the benefit of this subdivision once special prerequisites are satisfied under (b)(1).
3. Before a court can discharge a defendant, the court must make complete inquiry to ensure that discharge is appropriate.
(a)(2). Speedy Trial upon Demand.
1. Trial cannot be scheduled within 5 days of the filing of the demand without the consent of both the state and the defendant.
2. Before a court can discharge a defendant, the court must make complete inquiry to ensure that discharge is appropriate.
3. Prisoners in Florida are now treated like any other defendant [formerly (b)(2)].
4. Federal prisoners and prisoners outside Florida may claim the benefit of this subdivision once special prerequisites are satisfied under (b)(1).
(a)(3). Commencement of Trial.
1. Minor change in language to reflect case law.
(a)(4). Custody. [NEW]
1. Custody is defined in terms tantamount to arrest. This definition was formerly contained in (a)(1).
2. Where a notice to appear is served in lieu of arrest, custody results on the date the notice is served.
(b)(1). Prisoners outside Jurisdiction. [NEW]
1. Prisoners outside the jurisdiction of Florida may claim benefit under (a)(1) and (a)(2) after the prisoner returns to the jurisdiction of the court
where the charge is pending and after the prisoner files and serves a notice of this fact.
2. As an alternative, certain prisoners may claim the benefit of sections 941.45–941.50, Florida Statutes (1979).
3. Former (b)(1) is repealed.
1. Where a misdemeanor and felony are consolidated for purposes of trial in circuit court, the misdemeanor is governed by the same time
period applicable to the felony. To claim benefit under this provision, the crimes must be consolidated before the normal time period applicable to
misdemeanors has expired.
2. Former (b)(2) is repealed.
(b)(3). Repealed and superseded by (b)(1).
(c). Demand for Speedy Trial.
1. The subdivision recognizes that an invalid (spurious) demand must be stricken.
2. The subdivision now puts a 5-day limit on the time when a defendant must be prepared.
(d)(1). Motion for Discharge.
1. Under the amended provision, a prematurely filed motion is invalid and may be stricken.
(d)(2). When Time May Be Extended.
1. The terms “waiver,” “tolling,” or “suspension” have no meaning within the context of the subdivision as amended. The subdivision
addresses extensions for a specified period of time.
2. Except for stipulations, all extensions require an order of the court.
3. The term “recorded order” refers to stenographic recording and not recording of a written order by the clerk.
(d)(3). Delay and Continuances.
1. Even though the normal time limit has expired under (a)(1) or (a)(2), a trial court may not properly discharge a defendant without making a
complete inquiry of possible reasons to deny discharge. If the court finds that the time period has been properly extended and the extension has
not expired, the court must simply deny the motion. If the court finds that the delay is attributable to the accused, that the accused was unavailable
for trial, or that the demand was invalid, the court must deny the motion and schedule trial within 90 days. If the court has before it a valid motion
for discharge and none of the above circumstances are present, the court must grant the motion.
(e). Availability for Trial.
1. Availability for trial is now defined solely in terms of required attendance and readiness for trial.
(f). Exceptional Circumstances.
1. The 2 extension limit for unavailable evidence has been discarded.
2. The new trial date paragraph was eliminated because it simply was unnecessary.
(g). Effect of Mistrial; Appeal; Order of New Trial.
1. Makes uniform a 90-day period within which a defendant must be brought to trial after a mistrial, order of new trial, or appeal by the state or
(h)(1). Discharge from Crime.
1. No change.
(h)(2). Nolle Prosequi.
1. No change.
(a)(1). Repeals the remedy of automatic discharge from the crime and refers instead to the new subdivision on remedies.
(a)(2). Establishes the calendar call for the demand for speedy trial when filed. This provision, especially sought by prosecutors, brings the
matter to the attention of both the court and the prosecution. The subdivision again repeals the automatic discharge for failure to meet the
mandated time limit, referring to the new subdivision on remedies for the appropriate remedy.
(i). The intent of (i)(4) is to provide the state attorney with 15 days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the
motion for discharge. This time begins with the filing of the motion and continues regardless of whether the judge hears the motion.
This subdivision provides that, upon failure of the prosecution to meet the mandated time periods, the defendant shall file a motion for
discharge, which will then be heard by the court within 5 days. The court sets trial of the defendant within 10 additional days. The total 15-day
period was chosen carefully by the committee, the consensus being that the period was long enough that the system could, in fact, bring to trial a
defendant not yet tried, but short enough that the pressure to try defendants within the prescribed time period would remain. In other words, it
gives the system a chance to remedy a mistake; it does not permit the system to forget about the time constraints. It was felt that a period of 10
days was too short, giving the system insufficient time in which to bring a defendant to trial; the period of 30 days was too long, removing
incentive to maintain strict docket control in order to remain within the prescribed time periods.
The committee further felt that it was not appropriate to extend the new remedy provisions to misdemeanors, but only to more serious offenses.
1992 Amendment. The purpose of the amendments is to gender neutralize the wording of the rule. In addition, the committee recommends the
rule be amended to differentiate between 2 separate and distinct pleadings now referred to as “motion for discharge.” The initial “motion for
discharge” has been renamed “notice of expiration of speedy trial time.”